In the past, China was engaged in economic retaliation against France and Norway, two leading countries in the Europe. This study provides insight into the dynamics of this economic retaliation, the crisis management strategies of France and Norway, and analyses how South Korea can learn from the conflict resolution efforts of these two nations as it develops political strategies to manage potential conflicts with China, as well as the role of local government in the process. The conclusions of the study are as follows:
The economic retaliatory measures taken by China show that the country a) exerts political or diplomatic pressure before economic retaliation against the target country, b) boycotts goods and services more often than embargoes or financial sanctions to minimize the adverse impact on its own country, c) minimizes the direct impact on the targeted country’s economy by restricting the scope of retaliation as its main purpose is to inflict political damage, d) allows protests in China, as long as they are under the Party’s control, and e) continues to adopt retaliatory measures until political and diplomatic goals are accomplished. 
When China saw boycott campaigns against Carrefour, the French retailer, the French government’s first move was to immediately dispatch high-level officials to China, as part of its efforts to resolve conflict with Beijing. It is particularly notable that this was quickly followed by a visit from a former Prime Minister of France who is a long-time friend of China. These actions show that French authorities well understand “guanxi”, the dynamics of social network deeply rooted in Chinese culture. The French approach was centered around ways to protect “mianzi”, or the social (or in this case, political and diplomatic) status of the two countries. 
On the other hand, the Norwegian government stated that the Nobel Committee’s decision over the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (at the heart of China’s dispute with Norway) was non-governmental as the Committee is independent of the government, while taking a tit-for-tat approach against the political and diplomatic pressures from China. Oslo also took China’s restrictions on imports of Norwegian seafood to the WTO, making the dispute an international matter. The “carrot” in its strategy was to open windows of opportunity for a broader cultural and human exchange, with coercive diplomatic measures being the “stick”.
The strategy of France and Norway has implications for the Korean government’s crisis management capabilities regarding South Korea-China relations. First, the initial political and diplomatic pressures from China serve as warning signs. Second, Chinese economic retaliation is all about political taming of the targeted country, not damaging its economy. Third, China targets certain industries to maximize the political impact of retaliation. Fourth, China is open to negotiation when the country is hit by retaliation to begin dialogue. Lastly, Negotiation is effective only when backed by both “carrot” and “stick”.
The conclusions of our analysis leave five key lessons for South Korea with regard to crisis management strategies. Normal South Korea-China relations require the Korean government to a) identify issues on which the two countries may not see eye-to-eye and create conflict resolution scenarios for each topic, b) build a multi-level governance system to expand the role of each actor, c) prepare key industries for any potential damage and design support systems for those industries, d) diversify communication channels and send special envoys that best understand China and its culture, and e) identify the strategic limits for each issue and prepare a “stick” for negotiations.